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Strategies to control Classical Swine Fever: cost and risk perspectives
Abstract
The paper examines the importance of pig population density in the area of an outbreak of
CSF for the spread of the disease and the choice of control measures. A sector-level market
and trade model and a spatial, stochastic, dynamic epidemiological simulation model for the
Netherlands were used. Outbreaks in sparsely and densely populated areas were compared
under four different control strategies and with two alternative trade assumptions.
Results indicate that the control strategy required by current EU legislation is enough to
eradicate an epidemic starting in an area with sparse pig population. By contrast, additional
control measures are necessary if the outbreak begins in an area with high pig population
density. The economic consequences of using preventive slaughter rather than emergency
vaccination as an additional control measure depend strongly on the reactions of trading
partners. Reducing the number of animal movements significantly reduces the size and length
of epidemics in areas with high pig density.
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1.  Introduction
Epidemics of exotic contagious animal diseases such as Classical Swine Fever (CSF) and
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can have a high cost for the national economy. Mangen et al.
(2001b) found negative net welfare effects for the Dutch economy of 243 to 466 mn Euro
(assuming an export ban on live pigs) for an epidemic comparable to the 1997/1998 Dutch
CSF epidemic (hereafter “the Dutch CSF epidemic”). The effect of the 2001 FMD epidemic
on the UK economy in the same year has been estimated at £2.4 - £4.1 bn (Houlder, 2001). A
large part of these costs is directly related to the size and duration of the epidemic.
Among the factors determining the spread of an infectious animal disease are the number and
type of off-farm contacts in the period after a herd becomes infected but before the infection
is detected and the farm is isolated. In this paper we study the interaction between these
factors and the pig population density in the area of the initial outbreak. We hypothesise that,
if routine off-farm contacts are numerous for apparently uninfected farms, the risk of a large
epidemic is greater, and particularly so in areas of high pig density.
The main goal of this study is to provide decision-makers with insights into the epidemiological
and economic effects of control strategies for epidemics, given the uncertainties related to these
factors. Two specific questions are addressed. (1) Should different control strategies be used in
areas with sparse and dense pig populations? (2) Does reducing the number of direct animal
contacts and transport contacts per farm reduce the size of the epidemic?
We simulated epidemics beginning in either a SPLA or a DPLA
2, and assuming four different
control strategies: the current minimum controls as mandated by EU legislation (EU),
                                                        
2 SPLA (DPLA) stands for sparsely (densely) populated livestock area. In this study only one livestock species
is considered: pigs. A SPLA (DPLA) has up to 300 (>300) pigs per square km at regional level.3
preventive slaughter in addition to EU (PS), and two options for an emergency vaccination
strategy: vaccination in addition to PS, with subsequent destruction of vaccinated animals
(DD), and vaccination in addition to EU with monitored intra-community trade in the meat
from vaccinated animals (ICT). The economic benefits and costs of epidemics assuming each
of these four strategies and the two livestock densities were calculated using the economic
framework described in Mangen et al. (2001b). In addition, we considered two different trade
reactions: a partial trade ban for the quarantine zones (protection and surveillance zones) only
or in addition a total export ban for all Dutch live pigs. This results in 16 different
combinations of pig population density + control strategy + trade reaction.
Furthermore, we implemented two alternative sets of assumptions regarding the number of
direct animal contacts and the number of transport contacts per farm for some of these
combinations.
2.  Methodology
2.1   InterCSF and further adaptations for the current work
InterCSF, a spatial, temporal and stochastic simulation model, developed by Jalvingh et al.
(1999), simulates daily disease spread from infected farms through three contact types
(animals, vehicles, persons) and through local spread. All Dutch pig farms are known by their
geographical co-ordinates, their farm type and their stock numbers. The main disease-control
mechanisms that influence the disease spread in InterCSF are: diagnosis of the infected
farms, depopulation of infected farms, movement controls within quarantine areas, tracing
and preventive slaughter. Mangen et al. (2001a) added emergency vaccination as a control
option to InterCSF with a gradual non-linear increase over time of protection from
vaccination as well as constrained vaccination capacities.
For the current study, a more generic version of the InterCSF model was needed, in order to
predict the course of epidemics. We next describe the most important changes and
adaptations of InterCSF, now called InterCSF_v3.
2.1.1  Carrier piglets, minor and major within-herd outbreaks
Infection of a susceptible herd can lead to a minor (3-5 infected animals) or a major (> 5
infected animals) within-herd outbreak. The probabilities of a minor or a major within-herd
outbreak depend on farm type and farm status. For certain events (e.g. detection) we
distinguish three farm types, according to type of animal: (1) sows and piglets only; (2) no
sows; (3) sows and finishing pigs. For other events (e.g. disease spread) five farm types,
defined according to production system, are used: (1) multiplier; (2) finisher; (3) multiplier-
finisher; (4) breeding farm and (5) AI-stations. Two farm statuses are distinguished: (1)
vaccinated or (2) non-vaccinated. For a sow farm with a minor within-herd outbreak, the
probability of carrier piglets later on is now included in the model. Farms with a minor
within-herd outbreak remain susceptible if not vaccinated, and we assume that, with the birth
of carrier piglets on a susceptible farm, a major within-herd outbreak will occur. Information
on input parameters are available on request.
2.1.2  Infectivity
Farm type, farm status and farm size (we distinguish small, medium and large farms) are now
factors that determine the maximum length of infectivity for farms with a major within-herd4
infection. After the infectious period, a farm can infect other farms only via transport of
carrier piglets. Farms with a minor within-herd outbreak will never be infectious towards
other farms, except for carrier piglets transported off. Currently a flat infectivity curve is used
that is either “0” (not infected) or “1” (infected), but other curves (where infectivity varies
over time) may be incorporated in InterCSF_v3.
Increased bio-security related to transport contacts may have an impact on virus transmission.
To reflect that, once an epidemic has started, increased bio-security measures will be taken
within a quarantine zone, we reduce the probability of infection by 50 % for transport
contacts for the purpose of welfare slaughter.
2.1.3  Detection
Because of the distinction between minor and major within-herd outbreaks, the concept of
detection of an infected herd is changed drastically. By assumption, minor within-herd
outbreaks are detected by serology only. The period before the first detection of an epidemic
for major within-herd outbreaks is randomly drawn from a log-normal distribution with a
minimum of 21 days (3 weeks), a maximum of 100 days (Elbers et al., 1999) and a mean of
49 days. After the first detected case, all major-within herd outbreaks may be detected based
on clinical signs, with the interval based on a lognormal distribution with a minimum of 1
week and a maximum of 12 weeks. The detection probabilities due to clinical signs range
from 70% for AI-station to 85 % for multiplier farms (Fritzmeier et al., 2000, and Elbers et
al., 1999). As in Mangen et al. (2001a) we assume that vaccinated and later infected farms
will never show clinical signs, and can only be detected by serology.
Control events, such as tracing, surveillance, preventive and welfare slaughter, intermediate
screening, end-screening and vaccination, can all lead to the detection of an infected farm
(information available on request). Sample size, the within-herd outbreak type, the farm type
and the time interval between infection and the control event affect the probability of such
detection. The frequency of different control events is based on the Dutch animal health
authorities guidelines for a future epidemic (RVV, 2000).
2.1.4  Adaptations related to emergency vaccination
Infection of a vaccinated and maximum protected farm will cause only a minor within-herd
outbreak, with a 50 % lower probability of the birth of carrier piglets than on a non-
vaccinated farm (Dewulf et al., 2001). Vaccinated but not yet maximum protected farms that
become infected are assumed similar to non-vaccinated farms with a minor within-herd
outbreak. The infectious period of vaccinated farms is 30 days (see Mangen et al., 2001a) and
carrier piglets will never cause a major within-herd outbreak. After 30 days' infectivity only
the transport of carrier piglets off the farm can lead towards an infection of another
susceptible herd.
Criteria may be defined to trigger the decision to start an emergency vaccination campaign.
The first criterion is a minimum pig density around the first detected herd. Other criteria are:
a minimum number of detected farms in the first week; detection in a DPLA within the 6 first
weeks; a minimum number of detected farms in 7 days within the first 6 weeks. As soon as
one of those criteria is fulfilled, emergency vaccination begins immediately. In our
emergency vaccination simulations in this paper, these thresholds are all set to 0.
Consequently, emergency vaccination always begins on the day of the first detection.
2.1.5  Other adaptations5
In InterCSF_v3, empty farms may be repopulated as soon as the quarantine restrictions are
lifted. All repopulated farms are considered susceptible again and may become newly
infected. We further allow that an infected farm that is not detected becomes susceptible
again after an appropriate time.
All input parameters were revised, according to the most recent literature and expertise from
different fields and from different countries. Where no information was available, assumptions
were made. A new contact matrix is included that will be discussed in section 2.3.
2.2   Validation and calibration
After verification of the newly incorporated mechanisms by consulting literature and experts
from the field, InterCSF_v3 was newly validated and re-calibrated. Having only one recent
epidemic in the Netherlands, the simulated output could not be compared with real data. As
an alternative validation measure, sensitivity analysis was applied by increasing or decreasing
input parameters before and after calibration (Law and Kelton, 1991).
InterCSF_v3 was not calibrated on a specific Dutch epidemic, in contrast to the original
InterCSF. We did not know whether to classify the Dutch CSF epidemic as a small, medium
or worst-case epidemic. However, the long high-risk period, the increased number of
movements the day before the installation of the first movement stand-still zone and the
infection of two AI-station in this specific epidemic (Elbers et al., 1999) are all reasons for
assuming that it was rather a worst-case scenario. We therefore calibrated our model such
that using the contact matrix of Jalvingh et al. (1999), we would obtain at least 15 replications
with at least as many detected farms as occurred in the Dutch CSF epidemic.
To be able to compare simulated epidemics of InterCSF_v3 with earlier InterCSF results
(Jalvingh et al., 1999), we simulated the minimum EU strategy with an additional preventive
slaughter strategy after 3 months. During calibration, we doubled the transmission
probabilities of Stegeman et al. (2002) as discussed in more detail in section 4.1. We also
corrected the estimated transmission probabilities of Stegeman et al. (2002) for a 15%
probability of minor within-herd outbreaks.
2.3   Contact matrix
Three contact types between pig farms are defined: (1) direct animal contact, (2) transport
contact and (3) professional contact. The contact matrix defines the number of contacts
between all farm types and is specific for the Dutch situation. After the Dutch CSF epidemic,
the Dutch authorities adapted the legislation for pig transport with the aim of reducing the
spread of disease in future epidemics (LNV, 2000). A newly estimated contact structure,
based on analysis of recent Dutch identification and registration data (Mourits et al, 2001)
and on new Dutch legislation for pig transports (Regeling varkenslevering, LNV 2000)
resulted in fewer transports off or to the farm for all farm types as well as in a slight reduction
in indirect contacts. The frequency of professional contacts was assumed unchanged.
Simulated epidemics using this new contact matrix are compared with the simulated
epidemics using the contact structure of Jalvingh et al. (1999).6
2.4   Simulating epidemic control with different pig densities
2.4.1  Control strategies simulated
Different control strategies to control CSF epidemics in both a SPLA and a DPLA are
simulated with the new InterCSF_v3 model.
Stamping-out infected herds and tracing all contacts with infected herds, in addition to the
setting up of quarantine zones, is the current minimum EU legislation (EU strategy). Inside
quarantine zones, surveillance and serological screening are used. In the case of a movement
standstill that will last longer than the minimum 42 days, slaughter and rendering of ready-to-
deliver finishers and piglets begins after 4 weeks.
The preventive slaughter strategy (PS strategy) involves the use of preventive slaughtering on
farms in a radius of 750 to 1000 m around a detected herd as an additional control measure
(Nielen et al., 1999). When emergency vaccination is used as an additional control measure,
we distinguish between the delayed destruction strategy (DD strategy) and the intra-
community trade strategy (ICT strategy) (Mangen et al., 2001a). With the DD strategy all
vaccinated herds are slaughtered and rendered, whereas with the ICT strategy, pig meat of
vaccinated pigs may be traded within the EU as soon as the quarantine zone is lifted.
2.4.2  Economic framework
Mangen et al. (2001b) developed an economic framework to calculate the impact on the
Dutch economy of epidemics simulated in InterCSF, assuming different trade scenarios. In
this framework, EpiPigFlow converts the daily output of InterCSF to a weekly flow of piglets
that becomes an input into DUPIMA, a partial equilibrium model of the Dutch pig market.
DUPIMA simulates market prices, domestic offtake and trade flows. A second micro-
economic model (EpiCosts) uses output from InterCSF and the estimated market prices from
DUPIMA to calculate the expenditure by the animal health authorities to control the
epidemic. EpiCosts also calculates the changes in producer surplus for pig producers inside
quarantine zones. An Excel worksheet combines the results of EpiCosts and DUPIMA to
calculate the economic welfare changes of producers and consumers (slaughterhouses and
processing industry, retailer and final consumer), as well as the extra expenditure of the
Dutch health authorities. Retailers' total margins are assumed to be unchanged in all
scenarios. The economic welfare changes of the different stakeholders are aggregated to
determine the net welfare effect for the Dutch economy. As in Mangen et al. (2001b), we
assume two alternative trade scenarios for each simulated epidemic: a partial ban imposed
only on the quarantine zone and a total export ban on all live pigs.
DUPIMA was originally calibrated on prices and quantities of 1996 (Mangen et al., 2001b), a
year with exceptionally high pig prices. We now re-calibrate the model to the last half of
1999 and the first half of 2000. During this period, pig prices were recovering but were still at
a low level. We correct downwards the variable cost saved per finisher not produced, which
were based on a 5 year average (Snoek et al., 1999), which results in a zero change in
producer surplus for finisher producers inside a quarantine zone with empty stables.7
3.  Results
3.1   Contact reduction
The effect of adopting the new contact matrix is shown in Table 1, simulating an epidemic in
a DPLA using the EU strategy in the 3 months after the first detection and the PS strategy
thereafter. Fewer animal and transport contacts result in fewer infected and detected farms for
medium and large-scale epidemics, although epidemic duration is not much shorter. We note
that by far the greatest source of infection in a DPLA is local spread. Fewer animal contacts
has a direct effect on the spread of infection, but also an indirect effect on the potential for
locally spread infection.
Table 1: Effect of the changed contact matrix in a DPLA area on the simulated results, given the
EU strategy as control measure for the first 3 months and followed by the PS-strategy: mean
effects and effects for the simulations ranked 5, 50 and 95 according to the corresponding
epidemiological outcome
Contact structure Old contact structure
(Jalvingh et al., 1999)
New contact structure
(Mourits et al., 2001)
Percentile/ Mean Mean 5% 50% 95% Mean 5% 50% 95%
# Infected farms 296 65 231 752 130 51 113 226
- minor 49 9 38 125 21 9 19 39
-  m i n o r  &  c a r r i e r 1 0151002
- major 245 55 190 617 108 41 95 186
# Detected farms 254 57 197 638 112 46 98 186
# Prev. sl. farms 324 64 258 887 129 33 98 312
Duration (days) 245 178 239 321 220 168 214 281
Infected due to:
- local spread 244 56 189 645 114 45 99 196
- animal contact 17 2 12 43 3 0 2 10
- transport contact 15 2 13 33 3 0 2 7
- professional 19 2 14 54 9 2 7 19
3.2   Epidemics in a SPLA compared with a DPLA
3.2.1  Epidemiological results
We simulate CSF epidemics in the Netherlands that start in either a DPLA or a SPLA. For
each region, we simulate CSF epidemics using the four alternative control strategies. For
each variant, 100 replications are performed. We present results at the 5th, 50th and 95th
percentile of various outcomes.
The first infected farm (index farm) for the DPLA simulations is located in Boekel in the South
West region, which has the highest pig density in the Netherlands. The PS, DD or ICT strategies
reduce the length and the size of the simulated epidemics by more than 75% compared to the EU
strategy (Table 2). These three strategies reduce the number of susceptible herds in the close
neighbourhood of an infected herd, and as a consequence fewer farms are infected via local
spread. The DD strategy results in epidemics that are smallest in size and length. However, with
this strategy, a large number of pig farms have to be preventively slaughtered whereas with ICT,
only infected and detected farms are slaughtered for control purposes.
The index farm for the SPLA simulations is located in Berkel en Rodenrijs in the province of
South Holland. For SPLA epidemics, all control strategies seem to be similarly effective8
(Table 2). Reducing the number of susceptible herds in the close neighbourhood of an
infected herd has little or no impact, because there are hardly any neighbouring farms within
the endangered radius. As long as the epidemic remains in a SPLA, the spread of the virus is
strongly linked to movement contacts.
3.2.2  Economic results
Two alternative definitions of epidemic size are used: length of the epidemic in days and the
number of detected farms
3. All 100 replications are ranked according to each of these criteria.
The average of the three replications centred on the 5
th, 50
th and 95
th percentiles of "size"
represent “small”, “medium” and “large” epidemics respectively.
The economic welfare changes of the different stakeholders for small, medium and large
epidemics for both definitions of size are shown for the DPLA region in Table 3 and for the
SPLA region in Table 4.
For all four strategies, the reduction in national supply is not matched by a fall in total
demand when export continues from non-quarantine zones. Pig prices outside quarantine
zones rise. Hence, producers collectively gain and consumers lose. We assume a 50 %
contribution from the EU budget towards the total extra expenditure on controlling the
epidemic. However, if the EU contribution were lower, expenditure from Dutch public funds
would increase, resulting in a larger negative net welfare effect for the Dutch economy. In the
case of a DPLA, the PS, DD and ICT strategies result in smaller economic welfare changes
for all stakeholders than the EU strategy. Epidemics in a SPLA are smaller in size and length
than epidemics in a DPLA, with lower welfare changes for producers and consumers.
With an export ban on live pigs, a segment of demand is removed from the Dutch market.
When the epidemic is small, the fall in demand outweighs the small reduction in pig supply
due to movement restrictions and so prices fall. Producers lose surplus. With an increased
number of affected farms (large epidemics in size and/or length), a larger share of the pig
population is taken out of the market and so the drop in simulated market prices is smaller.
This leads to the unexpected result that, with a total export ban, SPLA epidemics cause larger
negative net welfare effects than epidemics in a DPLA although SPLA epidemics are on
average smaller in size and length. Table 5 shows details of the distribution of welfare
changes of piglet, finisher and breeding stock producers for two trade scenarios, whereby we
distinguish for each producer category if they are inside quarantine zones (Q) or outside the
quarantine zones.
Tables 3 and 4 show that government expenditure to control the epidemic increases with the
size of the epidemic. Animal welfare slaughter compensation takes the largest share of total
government expenditure on control programs. These payments are highly related to the length
of the epidemic and the number of farms in quarantine zones.
When exports are banned, slaughterhouses gain as more animals are slaughtered domestically and
final consumers gain due to the decreased prices (Table 5). For both these stakeholders, the welfare
change is negative when foreign trade continues from non-quarantine zones.
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epidemics in terms of both duration and number of “detected” farms is likely to be greater.9
Table 2: Effects of different control strategies, given different control strategies applied and different densely populated pig areas: effects for the
simulations ranked 5, 50 and 95 according to the corresponding epidemiological outcome (new contact matrix)
+ Emergency vaccination Strategy Minimum required by the EU + Preventive slaughter
 Delayed destruction Intra-community trade
 a)
Percentile 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95%
DPLA (Boekel)
# Infected 65 170 963 9 38 92 9 29 69 10 34 73
-  minor 12 29 169 1 6 13 1 5 14 2 8 17
 -  m i n o r  &  c a r r i e r 014001001001
-  major 52 139 792 7 32 68 6 24 57 6 26 59
# Detected 65 166 923 4 25 65 4 19 50 10 33 73
# Preventive slaughtered - - - 40 113 281 134 375 971 - - -
#  V a c c i n a t e d ------ 8 4 2 4 9 7 8 1 1 7 3 4 1 9 1079





- Local spread 57 150 877 6 32 71 6 22 48 7 28 52
- Direct animal contact 0 3 10 0 2 10 0 2 10 0 2 10
-  T r a n s p o r t  c o n t a c t 037027026026
-  P r o f e s s i o n a l  c o n t a c t 3 1 5 7 5 028016016
SPLA (Berkel en Rodenrijs)
# Infected 2 5 24 2 5 16 2 5 13 2 5 16
-   m i n o r 013013012013
 -  m i n o r  a n d  c a r r i e r 000000000000
-   m a j o r 1 52 01 41 31 41 21 41 3
# Detected 2 5 24 1 3 11 1 3 10 2 5 16
#  P r e v e n t i v e  s l a u g h t e r e d - - - 1 22 25 21 63 2 1 0 4- - -
#  V a c c i n a t e d ------00 5 4 8 3 1 1 5 7





-  L o c a l  s p r e a d 01 1 2 016015016
-  D i r e c t  a n i m a l  c o n t a c t 014014014014
-  T r a n s p o r t  c o n t a c t 014014014014
-  P r o f e s s i o n a l  c o n t a c t 014003003003
Note:
a)  In the case of the intra-community trade scenario 120 days extra should be added for zones in which vaccination was used.10
Table 3: Economic welfare analysis of two different trade scenarios, given the EU, the PS, the DD and the ICT strategy in a DPLA: economic welfare
analysis in 10
6 EUR for a small, medium and large sized epidemics, ranked on the length of the epidemic, respectively on the number of detected
farms
Scenario EU strategy PS strategy DD strategy ICT strategy
Epidemic size small medium large small medium large small medium large small medium large
No trading from the quarantine zones
a) Ranked on the length of the epidemic
Change in PS 318 488 914 79 169 261 84 204 359 107 182 235
Change in CS -198 -316 -558 -45 -102 -171 -49 -129 -230 -63 -109 -142
Public funds -125 -191 -351 -25 -61 -102 -26 -74 -162 -37 -69 -90
Net welfare effect -5 -19 5
a 96 - 1 281 - 3 275 - 3
b)  Ranked on the number of detected farms
Change in PS 276 495 869 83 288 411 96 185 275 151 242 357
Change in CS -178 -320 -533 -49 -166 -254 -58 -113 -181 -89 -145 -211
Public funds -104 -201 -338 -27 -111 -175 -31 -65 -108 -55 -96 -155
Net welfare effect -6 -26 -2 8 11 -17 7 7 -14 7 1 -9
No trading from the quarantine zones combined with a total export ban on all Dutch live pigs
a) Ranked on the length of the epidemic
Change in PS -200 -160 -167 -295 -273 -249 -283 -167 -9 -296 -262 -268
Change in CS 230 262 520 218 237 248 208 143 55 231 231 264
Public funds -107 -162 -297 -23 -55 -91 -24 -70 -152 -33 -62 -79
Net welfare effect -77 -60 56
b -100 -91 -91 -99 -94 -107 -98 -92 -83
a)  Ranked on the number of detected farms
Change in PS -336 -119 -91 -292 -146 -12 -269 -201 -91 -306 -200 -67
Change in CS 351 219 410 216 167 78 200 173 94 264 194 111
Public funds -88 -170 -286 -24 -100 -160 -29 -61 -101 -49 -87 -142
Net welfare effect -72 -69 33
b -100 -80 -94 -98 -89 -99 -91 -93 -97
Note:
a)  Fewer farms in quarantine zones for replication 95 leads to much lower control expenditure, resulting in a positive net welfare effect.
b)  A large number of farms were in quarantine zones. As a consequence, the price drop for finisher producers was more than compensated by the lower
piglet prices. Finisher producers collectively gained and piglet producer collectively loss, resulting in a total low negative welfare effect of pig producer.11
Table 4: Economic welfare analysis of two different trade scenarios, given the EU, the PS, the DD and the ICT strategy in a SPLA: economic welfare
analysis in 10
6 EUR for a small, medium and large sized epidemics, ranked on the length of the epidemic, respectively on the number of detected
farms
Scenario EU strategy PS strategy DD strategy    ICT strategy
Epidemic size small medium large small medium large small medium large small medium large
No trading from the quarantine zones
a)  Ranked on the length of the epidemic
Change in PS 8 8 19 8 28 20 9 11 19 7 11 10
Change in CS -5 -4 -9 -5 -15 -11 -5 -6 -11 -4 -6 -5
Public funds -1
a -1 -6 -1
a -7 -6 -1
a -2 -5 -1
a -2 -3
N e t  w e l f a r e  e f f e c t 324354333232
c)  Ranked on the number of detected farms
C h a n g e  i n  P S 77 4 989 2 29 1 1 2 679 3 9
Change in CS -4 -4 -25 -5 -5 -13 -5 -7 -15 -4 -4 -21
Public funds -1
a -1 -14 -1
a -1 -6 -1
a -2 -7 -1
a -2 -11
N e t  w e l f a r e  e f f e c t 229323335237
No trading from the quarantine zones combined with a total export ban on all Dutch live pigs
a) Ranked on the length of the epidemic
Change in PS -373 -429 -547 -363 -356 -469 -363 -378 -445 -380 -403 -468
Change in CS 264 326 465 254 257 378 253 272 350 272 300 371
Public funds -1
a -1 -5 -1
a -7 -5 -1
a -2 -5 -1
a -2 -3
Net welfare effect -110 -104 -88 -110 -106 -96 -110 -108 -100 -109 -106 -99
b)  Ranked on the number of detected farms
Change in PS -402 -414 -478 -363 -381 -447 -363 -372 -397 -377 -406 -411
Change in CS 295 309 406 254 274 354 253 265 301 268 301 328
Public funds -1
a -1 -12 -1
a -1 -6 -1
a -2 -6 -1
a -1 -12
Net welfare effect -107 -106 -85 -110 -109 -98 -110 -109 -101 -110 -106 -95
Note:
a)  Less than 1 million euro.12
Table 5: Economic welfare analysis of two different trade scenarios, given the EU, the PS, the DD and the ICT strategy in a DPLA: economic welfare
analysis in 10
6 EUR for a small, medium and large sized epidemics, ranked on the length of the epidemic
Scenario EU strategy PS strategy DD strategy    ICT strategy
Epidemic size small medium large small medium large small medium large small medium large
No trading from the quarantine zones
Change in PS of:
- all producers 318 488 914 79 169 261 84 204 359 107 182 235
- piglet producers (outside Q) 110 172 268 27 59 101 32 83 138 37 61 78
- piglet producers (inside Q) 10 17 35 1
a 15 - 1 - 27246
- hog producers (outside Q) 186 282 564 51 104 147 53 118 175 67 112 145
- hog producers (inside Q) 21 30 67 2 7 15 2 10 45 4 11 13
- breeding producers 
b -9 -13 -20 -2 -3 -6 -2 -4 -6 -3 -5 -6
Change in CS
 c of:
- all consumers -198 -316 -558 - 45 -102 -171 -49 -129 -230 -63 -109 -142
- slaughterhouses -8 -15 -30 -1
a -3 -7 -2 -7 -13 -1 -2 -4
- final consumer -190 -301 -528 - 45 -99 -164 -47 -121 -217 -32 -106 -138
No trading from the quarantine zones combined with a total export ban on all Dutch live pigs
Change in PS of:
- all pig producers -200 -160 -167 -295 -273 -249 -283 -167 -9 -296 -262 -268
- piglet producers (outside Q) -175 -207 -416 -152 -169 -179 -144 -107 -66 -162 -168 -191
- piglet producers (inside Q) -8 -15 -21 -2 -4 -7 -3 -7 -3 -3 -3 -6
- hog producers (outside Q) -10 71 270 -137 -96 -60 -133 -52 31 -128 -87 -66
- hog producers (inside Q) 4 6 23 -1 1
a 4- 1
a 43 5- 1
a 32
- breeding producers 
b - 1 0 - 1 5 - 2 3- 2- 4- 7- 2- 5- 6- 3- 6- 7
Change in CS
 c of:
- all consumers 230 262 520 218 237 249 208 143 55 231 231 264
- slaughterhouses 76 92 176 55 66 76 52 43 37 61 67 78
- final consumer 154 170 344 163 171 173 156 100 18 170 164 186
Note:
a)  Less than 1 million euro.
b)  Only breeding producer inside quarantine zones are considered, because we assume no change for breeding producers outside the quarantine zones.
c)  We assume that the change for retailer is equal to zero.13
4.  Discussion
4.1   Sensitivity analysis
In all the simulations shown, the index farm is always a multiplier farm. To check the
sensitivity of the results to this assumption, the farm type of the index farm was changed to
be either a finisher, a multiplier-finisher or a breeding farm in each region. The impact of the
index farm type is negligible, although there is a slight tendency for smaller epidemics when
it is a finisher farm (on average a lower number of movement contacts) and larger epidemics
when it is a breeding farm (on average a higher number of movement contacts).
Sensitivity analysis performed by varying key parameters generally had little impact on the
results. Only contact and local spread transmission probabilities had a large impact on the
simulated results. The most reliable estimates of transmission probabilities (Stegeman et al.,
2002) produced epidemics that were considered small. Based on additional epidemiological
information, we doubled Stegeman’s transmission probabilities. Additionally, we corrected
the transmission probabilities 15% upwards because we also simulate minor within-herd
outbreaks and Stegeman’s analysis was based on large within-herd outbreaks only.
In how far these adjustments are justified for local spread is questionable, therefore
sensitivity analysis was necessary. In the case of a SPLA, the value of the transmission
probabilities for local spread are of minor importance for the size and the length of an
epidemic, whereas for a DPLA the simulated epidemic is larger in size and with a longer
duration when the parameters for local spread are doubled (results not shown).
4.2   Frequency of contacts
The new Dutch pig transport legislation aims to reduce the spread of future epidemics. Our
simulations assume a reduced number of transport contacts off the farm compared to Jalvingh
et al. (1999). These results indicate that a reduced number of animal contacts can
significantly reduce the spread of the virus. Even so, we might still overestimate the number
of farm contacts per infected farm and so overestimate the size of the simulated epidemics.
This is because, in InterCSF_v3, all contacts are randomly drawn and no fixed trading
partners are assumed. The current legislation, however, puts a maximum on the number of
contact herds resulting in a relatively small number of fixed trading relationships. Even
without reflecting this, our results already clearly show the potential of less frequent animal
transport between farms for reducing the size of future epidemics.
4.3   Different control strategies applied in a DPLA respectively a SPLA.
The probability of transmission by local spread has an impact on the size and the length of an
epidemic in a DPLA, whereas for a SPLA local spread is of little importance due to the
absence of close neighbouring farms. The assumptions made in InterCSF_v3 summarise
current knowledge as far as possible, but have a large impact on the simulated results. Which
factors influence the local spread of the virus, and how, is still an on-going research question.
For a SPLA, the standard EU strategy is always sufficient to control and eradicate the
epidemic whereas for a DPLA, the EU strategy is generally insufficient. Additional control
measures that decrease the number of susceptible herds in the close neighbourhood of an
infected farm are needed in order to reduce the size and the length of the epidemic.14
Emergency vaccination strategies are risk averse strategies as their worst-case replications are
smaller in size than for the PS strategy.
4.4   Policy implications
Our analysis indicates that when a CSF epidemic remains located in a SPLA, the standard EU
strategy is also economically optimal, whereas for a DPLA, the ICT strategy seems
economically most attractive, assuming no export trade ban. With the ICT strategy, the
changes in producer and consumer surplus are the lowest. Extra expenditure to control and
eradicate the virus is also the lowest of all simulated strategies. No extra programme costs for
the “post-vaccination” zone are included, but based on the existing identification and
registration system in the Netherlands, those costs are likely to be rather low.
Moreover, ethical reasons favour the ICT strategy as only infected herds are slaughtered and
rendered. However, acceptance of this strategy by EU trading partners, as well as by retailers
and final consumers, is highly questionable. As long as vaccinated animals are present, the
country's reduced pig health status may cause the loss of some important trading markets.
Moreover, the Netherlands trades more than 70 % of reared pigs (either as live animals or as
meat), most of them within the EU (Pluimers et al., 1999). A reduced health status in the
Netherlands may be seen by non-European countries as a reduced health status of the EU as a
whole and all EU exports may be banned by third importing countries. As a consequence,
Danish pig meat that is now mainly exported outside the EU could be dumped on the
European market.
During the 2001 FMD epidemic, the discussion about whether to slaughter vaccinated
animals and sell them on the Dutch market was abruptly ended by reservations from major
Dutch retailers about selling meat from vaccinated animals and recognition of the short-term
logistic problems of guaranteeing strict separation of meat originating from vaccinated
animals and from non-vaccinated animals (Jan Klaver (PVE), personal communication,
October 2001). As long as the political and the public acceptance of vaccination is
questionable (due to lack of a reliable diagnostic test, insufficient markets for vaccinated pig
meat or tough logistic problems), the risk of an export ban on live pigs favours the option of
preventive slaughter. However, in future epidemics overwhelming public and media pressure
may force the adoption of the DD strategy whereby pigs are first vaccinated but are later
slaughtered and rendered as there is no market available.
5.  Conclusions
Regarding the specific research questions addressed in this paper, we can report that, if the
new Dutch pig transport legislation is applied correctly, it will lead to a reduction of disease
spread in future CSF epidemics.
More important, our work shows that the pig density in the area of the initial outbreak is
relevant to the evolution of the epidemic and the choice of optimal control strategy. In a
SPLA, the EU strategy is in most cases sufficient to eradicate the disease, whereas in a DPLA
additional control measures are necessary. The simulation evidence indicates that any control
measures that lead to a total export ban of all live Dutch pigs should be avoided. Therefore,
given current political and public levels of acceptance, we conclude that the PS strategy is
economically the most rational if a CSF epidemic occurs in a DPLA whereas the EU strategy15
is sufficient in a SPLA. Accordingly, future epidemic control policy decisions should be area-
specific and based on pig density.
Finally, this work shows the need for more insight into transmission probabilities and the
mechanism of local spread, in order to refine the accuracy of InterCSF_v3.
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